Introduction
Historically Christians have affirmed two primary ways in which God has revealed himself to the world, namely, supernatural revelation and natural revelation. Louis Berkhof gave a helpful delineation between these two kinds of revelation in his Systematic Theology when he wrote “The mode of revelation is natural when it is communicated through nature, that is, through the visible creation with its ordinary laws and powers. It is supernatural when it is communicated to man in a higher, supernatural manner, as when God speaks to him, either directly, or through supernaturally endowed messengers.” Most, therefore, of what is typically thought of as Christian Theology entails the study of supernatural revelation; what God has said directly to man through supernatural means.
According to the Bible itself supernatural revelation has come to man in a couple of different forms. The author of Hebrews has written:
“Long ago, at many times and in many ways, God spoke to our fathers by the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world. He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature, and he upholds the universe by the word of his power. After making purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, having become as much superior to angels as the name he has inherited is more excellent than theirs.”
So, then, the prophets were one means by which God revealed himself supernaturally. The apostle Peter likewise spoke to this when he wrote:
And we have the prophetic word more fully confirmed, to which you will do well to pay attention as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning star rises in your hearts, knowing this first of all, that no prophecy of Scripture comes from someone's own interpretation. For no prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit.
But it is not just the prophets whom God spoke through according to Scripture but the same passage of Hebrews also says God supernaturally revealed himself in the person of Jesus, the uniquely divine Son of God. The Apostle John magnified the role Jesus played in furthering the revelation of God in the first chapter of his Gospel when he wrote “For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God; the only God, who is at the Father's side, he has made him known.” So then God has supernaturally revealed himself through prophets and even in coming of Jesus as the God-man.
Furthermore the apostle Paul has told us that God revealed himself in the Scripture writing “All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work.” It is here, upon the Scriptures, where most of Christian theology rests. It is precisely because the prophets and apostles have gone on to be with the Lord and that the Lord himself has ascended to the Father that Christians turn primarily to the Scripture, the breathed out word of God, to find his will for their lives. The Scriptures contain a record of God’s revelation through the prophets, apostles and Jesus himself and therefore it serves as the cornerstone for theological study and inquiry. The Scripture rightfully deserves to have the place of preeminence in Christian theology because it is a direct, supernatural and clear word from the maker of the universe.
Even so, natural revelation plays a very significant role in Christian theology and it is the purpose of this paper to argue that natural revelation is an essential part of Christian theology. From natural revelation we can do what is called ‘natural theology’. Natural theology is what we can learn about God from just what is commonly available to man in the natural order. Accepting Berkhof’s definition of natural revelation as the way in which God reveals himself “through the visible creation with its ordinary laws and powers” this paper will demonstrate, first, the advantage natural theology has over and against supernatural theology and, second, how from natural revelation, and by doing natural theology, it can be reasonably established that belief in God is rationally acceptable and, in turn, supernatural revelation is entirely plausible.
The Advantage of Natural Theology and Its Warranted Use
Rene’ Descartes once wrote “And first of all there is no doubt that in all things which nature teaches me there is some truth contained; for by nature, considered in general, I now understand no other thing than either God Himself or else the order and disposition which God has established in created things…” If natural theology has any clear advantages over supernatural revelation it is, first, in its universal accessibility to all mankind and, second, its logical priority epistemologically speaking. To the first point, natural theology works from a book that everyone can read no matter their language or location. There is no library card needed to check out the book of nature all you have to do is go outside. Whereas supernatural revelation requires either being in the presence of a true prophet or at least being able to access the true records of their teachings, which may exclude some or many from access, natural revelation has no restriction in this way. All people with normal mental capacities can use those faculties to examine the natural realm in order to draw these principles and conclusions from their observations. Natural theology, then, works from a place of neutrality, utilizing concepts upon which there is widespread knowledge and acceptance, to reason towards truth about God’s existence or the will of God.
As to the second point, while supernatural theology may have the preeminent place in Christian theology, natural theology has a logical priority over supernatural theology in that it demonstrates the rationality of belief in God and thereby makes the possibility of receiving direct communication from a supreme creator all the more acceptable. It is only common sense to answer the question ‘does God exist?’ prior to asking the question ‘what has God said?’. As such it follows that we ought to start with natural theology so we might then decide if the whole enterprise of studying special revelation is a worthy goal. Working from the advantageous position all mankind shares (equal access to nature) we can indeed establish with certainty that belief in God is rational and that therefore supernatural revelation from God is plausible.
It is certainly worth noting, especially for those Christian who might have their doubts about the viability of natural theology, Scripture actually affirms the truth that God can be known through the things he has made. None may have said it better than the apostle Paul who wrote:
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things.
That God has made himself plain to all people in the things he has made is evidenced by certain philosophers like Plato whom Augustine would go so far as to say was a lover of God. Even the apostle Paul encouraged the Athenian philosophers that God made this world in such a way that he was discoverable and “that they should seek God, and perhaps feel their way toward him and find him.” Thus validated by Scripture, and by example in the history of philosophy, there is good reason to be hopeful about the enterprise of using natural theology to find evidence for God.
Natural Arguments for a Supernatural Being
As Clenias has said “It is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men do.” The question of God’s existence is not a newly debated subject but it is inestimably important because on the answer to this question rests meaning, morality and eternity itself. It is no small wonder that the number of volumes which treat the subject are innumerable to mortal men. In the following section there will be given but a very small sampling of some of arguments of natural theology which have been put forward to make a case for the existence of God. It will be shown that these arguments are worthy of serious consideration and that they demonstrate belief in God is not an unevidenced assumption but, rather, a rational position held by thinking people across the centuries who have seriously considered the natural world and what it tells us.
Although the following arguments are often referred to as ‘proofs’ for God’s existence it would be easy to overestimate what they may reasonably accomplish. Alvin Plantinga, a contemporary Christian philosopher, has written about how he formerly had unreasonable expectation for natural theology:
I employed a traditional but wholly improper standard: I took it that these arguments are successful only if they start from propositions that compel assent from every honest and intelligent person and proceed majestically to their conclusion by way of forms of argument that can be rejected only on pain of insincerity or irrationality. Naturally enough, I joined the contemporary chorus in holding that none of the traditional arguments was successful. (I failed to note that no philosophical arguments of any consequence meet that standard; hence the fact that theistic arguments do not is of less significance than I thought.)
Natural theology, and the arguments made from it, provide a reasonable platform for belief in God. They do not prove God’s existence (if what is meant by ‘prove’ is that no one can contest any of the premises or conclusions) but they do provide a rational defense of the existence of God which many rational people find convincing.
If we are rationally warranted in believing God exists then we have a basis for believing that God would speak directly to us and therefore we have grounds for supernatural theology. For the the purposes of this paper four arguments will be considered in favor of rational belief in God’s existence. The first argument is known as the Ontological Argument, the second is known as the Cosmological Argument, the third is known as the Teleological Argument and the fourth is known as the Moral Argument. More arguments could certainly be given and discussed but even these will only be touched upon briefly in light of all that could be said about them and the numerous forms that each of these arguments have been presented in throughout the centuries.
The Ontological Argument
Of all the classical arguments for God’s existence produced by natural theology the Ontological Argument may be the most controversial. Because of this fact more time will be given to the opposition to this argument than with the rest of the arguments that follow. The Ontological Argument is so named because ‘ontology’ is the branch of metaphysical philosophy that addresses the question of being, that is, it asks ‘what is?’ Some have hailed the argument as the definitive answer to atheists whereas other Christians have themselves rejected the argument as little more than clever wordplay. Nevertheless the argument has been championed by a number of great philosophers throughout history and is still well represented today by some formidable scholars.
The first person to champion this argument with the confidence that it certainly proved God’s existence is Anselm. In his work Proslogion he wrote thus:
Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought. So can it be that no such thing exists, since “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’”? (Psalm 14:1; 53:1) But when this same fool hears me say “something than which nothing greater can be thought,” he surely understands what he hears; and what he understands exists in his understanding, even if he does not understand that he exists [in reality]. For it is one thing for an object to exist in the understanding and quite another to understand that the object exists [in reality]. When a painter, for example, thinks out in advance what he is going to paint, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand that it exists, since he has not yet painted it. But once he has painted it, he both has it in his understanding and understands that it exists because he has now painted it. So even the fool must admit that something than which nothing greater can be thought exists at least in his understanding, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood exists in the understanding. And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it exists only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist in reality as well, which is greater. So if that than which a greater cannot be thought exists only in understanding, then that than which a great cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But that is clearly impossible. Therefore, there is no doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the understanding and in reality.
Since Anselm made this argument it has been adopted and offered in various forms by proponents such as Renes’ Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz and still more recently are advocates such as Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig.
But while there have certainly been some brilliant minds who have found this argument compelling it can hardly be said to have been met without criticism. David Hume, for example, makes an argument concerning the capacity of human thought that would seem to offer a reasonable challenge to Anselm’s argument. Hume writes:
What never was seen or heard of, may yet be conceived, nor is anything beyond the power of thought except what implies an absolute contradiction. But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find upon a nearer examination that it is really confined within very narrow limits and that all of this creative power of the mind amounts to no more that the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive, because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment. The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
If Hume is correct about his understanding of the nature of human thought, that all thought comes from sensory experience and the rearrangement thereof, then this is a significant challenge to Anselm’s Ontological Argument.
Hume would, in effect, be able to say to Anselm that the being of which no greater can be imagined is simply a combination and augmentation of experiences you have actually had. Not that there is actually a maximally great being but one has met a great person and could therefore think of the qualities of that great person and enhance them in the imagination. The God of Anselm, then, could be little more than the combination and augmentation of other ideas that have been received through sensory perception in the world. Not that this at all defeats the notion that God may exist, but that Anselm’s argument may not achieve its goal of proving it.
Like Hume there have been other skeptics have not found this argument convincing but it is not just those who doubt the existence of God who are skeptical about this particular argument for his existence. In actuality some of the brightest minds of Christian intellectual history have also found Anselm’s Ontological Argument uncompelling. Aquinas, for example, writes in his Summa Theologica:
Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some believe God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word “God” is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists in the intellect. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought. And this is what is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.
So one the Christian faith’s greatest defenders in history, does not think the ontological succeeds either.
To the defense of the Ontological argument, many who have championed it since Anselm have given it new life by reworking it. Perhaps Anselm had a good idea which simply needed some work so it could avoid the objections it was at liable to in its original form. This is indeed what William Lane Craig believes to be the case. Craig thinks that Plantinga’s approach to the Ontological Argument succeeds and does so in part because Plantinga has profited “from the missteps and oversights of his predecessors”. Utilizing the philosophical concept of ‘possible worlds’ Plantinga offers a new form of the argument that may be more cogent.
This version of the Ontological argument starts with the premise that the idea of God is not a self-contradictory idea, that is to say that a being such as God is logically possible and goes on to demonstrate that God is not merely logically possible but logically necessary. Craig offers the following formulation of Plantinga’s argument:
It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
This formation of the argument avoids the problem raised by Hume’s understanding of human ideas because it is no longer arguing, as in its original form, that if a person conceives of a maximally great being then that being must necessarily exist. Instead it is arguing that if the idea of a maximally great being is not logically incoherent, then it must exist. How one came to conceive of this being is not relevant in this form of the argument, only whether or not the conception is logically possible; and it seems to be.
Even though the Ontological Argument is controversial it is, nonetheless, a very provocative argument produced by natural theology that has been found cogent by some very learned philosophers. As Plantinga has stated an argument does not have to convince everyone in order to be a good argument because intelligent people disagree all the time. With that being said let us now consider some other arguments from natural theology that have been more convincing to an even greater number of people.
The Teleological Argument
The next argument from natural theology to be considered is known as the Teleological Argument. This name is derived from the Greek word ‘Telos’ which refers to the end or aim of a thing (i.e. its purpose). The argument makes the case that the universe has the appearance of design towards some end which in turn leads to the necessity of a designer whom we call ‘God.’ When the argument is placed in deductive form it is often stated in a syllogism such as the following:
Everything which is designed has a designer.
The universe/biological life have indicators of having been designed.
Therefore the universe/biological life are best explained in reference to a designer.
Probably the most famous rendering of this argument comes from William Paley who famously used an example about finding a watch. In his work Natural Theology Paley wrote:
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer. that. for anything I knew to the contrary it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of the answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one result: We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to each other, conducting the motion of the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating the motion, as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work; but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood), the inference, we think, is inevtiable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.
Paley, just a little further down in his book follows this by saying, “For every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.”
For Paley, if we can clearly and indisputably discern that a watch requires a watchmaker then we are all the more so obligated to designate the natural realm as having been created by a nature maker because everything about the complexity of the watch is mirrored in nature and indeed the natural world has complexities that far exceed any watch. Obviously whatever would stand outside or above nature in order to create it would be, by definition, supernatural. Paley’s argument has been and continues to be influential for those considering the implications of the appearance of design in the universe and in biological life forms.
Paley aside, the Teleological Argument has been represented by many others both considerably earlier than Paley and up to this present day. To give chronology preference let us consider the ancient source first, Epictetus. Epictetus was Stoic philosopher born in the mid first century living contemporarily alongside some of the events recorded in the New Testament and early church fathers. Although he held a different conception of God than a Christian would he nevertheless made a case for the existence of God using a form of what could easily be identified as the Teleological Argument as it entails an argument for the existence of deity from the presence of complementary design. In his work, Discourses, he wrote:
If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in the case also would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that he had made both, but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of no use. Who is it, then, who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case to the knife? Is it no one? And, indeed, from the very structure of things which have contained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are constructed, do not even these declare the workman?
It should not be missed that there is a distinct point, albeit a complementary point, that is being made by Epictetus. Whereas Paley argued from the complexity of design to the necessity of a designer Epictetus points out not merely is there a complexity of design in nature but there is a multi-faceted complexity of design so as that one element of the universe is completely dependent upon another or upon numerous others elements for it to be able to fulfill its proper function (i.e. its ‘telos’). The interdependency of various functions we see in nature, according to Epictetus, is unexplainable apart from the existence of God. Epictetus says that things fit too nicely together, like a knife in a knife case, for us to determine that they are but mere coincidences of nature. It is more logical that there is an artificer behind the unity of nature than that these things are as they are by mere chance and Epictetus says to the skeptic, “let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion?”
Interestingly, when we take Paley’s argument and Epictetus’ approach together, we find they become very similar to how the current Intelligent Design movement lays out its case. What Epictetus said so long ago, joined with Paley's observations, have now found new life and even more power with modern scientific discoveries. In fact the contemporary Intelligent Design movement has created an argument about design in the universe based upon the concept of what is called ‘specified complexity’ in the universe and biological life. To understand what is meant by specified complexity let us give our attention to the work of William Dembski.
Dembski explains in his book Understanding Intelligent Design what is meant by specified complexity; “Complexity is the opposite of simplicity. It ensures that the object in question is not so simple that it can be readily explained by chance. Specificity is the opposite of randomness. It ensures that the object exhibits the type of pattern that could signal intelligence.” Dembski argues that neither of these things, complexity or specificity, are sufficient in themselves to indicate a designer but when both of them come together this is how we detect the presence of intelligent design. This is what Dembski calls a design inference. He goes on to explain why both components are necessary but are insufficient when alone:
...complexity alone is not enough to eliminate chance. Complex things happen by chance all the time. For instance, if you flip a penny one thousand times, you will witness a highly complex event, and therefore one that is highly improbable to reproduce by chance. Indeed, the sequence you flip will be one in a trillion trillion trillion…, where the ellipsis needs 21 more trillions. But this sequence alone will not trigger a design inference. Why not? Though highly complex, the pattern will in all likelihood fail to exhibit specificity. Contrast this with the sequence of prime numbers from 2 to 101. This sequence not only is complex but also is specified by an independently given pattern.
So, to put it another way, if you imagine looking down in your alphabet soup and seeing the word ‘sad’ spelled out in your bowl you could say that is an appearance of specificity because it is an intelligible word. Even so it lacks complexity because a three letter word is simple enough that one could expect random chance to align those three letters together in your bowl given enough chances. However if you looked down at your bowl of soup and read “I am really sad and am thinking of killing myself today” you now have both specificity and complexity which makes the likelihood of random chance highly improbable. You also have the need to talk with your loved ones to see who spelled this in your soup!
Obviously the argument goes beyond prime numbers and alphabet soup, but the principles apply to what we see in the universe both in the cosmos at large and also in biological living systems. Both the complexity of, for instance, the human body with all of its many parts, and the specificity of how those parts work and interact with one another have design inference. This is true not only of the human body but even of individual cells therein, and of all living organisms. In a similar way we see complexity in the universe as a whole with the various forces (such as gravity, the strong and weak nuclear forces, and electromagnetism) in relationship to all of the physical aspects of the universe (such as stars and planets) and we also see specificity in the way all of objects and forces of the universe work together in harmony to make life possible and the universe sustainable.
Whereas the Ontological argument is less accessible to the non-philosophically inclined majority, the Teleological argument is very practical and can utilize examples common to every person. It has had strong enough effect to not only instill greater confidence in those who believe but actually to change the mind of some of those who have previously not believed in God. A good present day example is Antony Flew, a long time critic of theism and committed atheist, Flew has admitted that the evidence is for design is, for him at least, so strong that it is not something he could deny any longer.
The Cosmological Argument
Another argument many have found persuasive is known as the Cosmological Argument. As is implied in the name, with the embedded root word ‘kósmos’ from the Greek, the argument has to do with the universe itself, specifically the origin thereof. In its deductive form the argument is sometimes formulated as follows:
Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore the universe has a cause.
There are numerous versions of the Cosmological Argument but all of them hinge on the concept of a final or sufficient cause as the explanation for everything else that exists. This sufficient cause would have to be, itself, uncaused, necessary and eternal among other things.
Augustine, in his work City of God, wrote about how the Platonists used their philosophical method to come to the conclusion that there is one sufficient cause for all other things that are not itself and that this being must be immaterial rather than corporeal:
These philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have transcended all bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies which are in it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of beasts; or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, as the life of angels - all can only be through Him who absolutely is.
What the Platonists realized, said Augustine, is that the first efficient cause must be immutable, that is, unchanging. The reason for this is because everything that is changing must be so by cause of something outside of itself. And whatever effects change upon something else must precede that which it affected. Therefore that which is the efficient cause of all things must itself be unchanging.
Aquinas argues similarly in the second of his five ways in his work Summa Theologica:
The second way is from the notion of efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (nor indeed, is it possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself, because in that case it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes, all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The principle of causality, although challenged by skeptics like Hume, is not a principle that can be rationally doubted. For even in rejecting to the principle one might be asked ‘to what are you responding?’ and find themselves damned from the outset. So then if the universe is not eternal (which there is not sufficient room to demonstrate beyond the implications of what Aquinas has already said) then it must be caused and because an infinite regress is impossible there must be a efficient cause that is itself uncaused. This universe causing being is what we call God.
The Moral Argument
Of all of the arguments we have considered in this paper this next one is perhaps the most accessible and often the most persuasive to the average person. The moral argument, as the name implies (this time free of the language barrier), is an argument for God upon the basis of morality. As before let us consider the argument in its deductive form:
If objective moral values exist then God exists.
Objective moral values exist.
Therefore God exists.
To consider this argument further we should consider the work of C. S. Lewis.
Lewis, in his book Mere Christianity, wrote about one issue that really caused him trouble as an atheist, “My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line.” So the very idea of just versus unjust caused Lewis a problem because he realized that if he could recognize things that were unjust he needed a perfect standard by which to measure them against. But where was such a standard to be found?
Furthermore Lewis points out that this is hardly a difficulty just for himself but that all men recognize the reality of justice and injustice in our world:
Every one has heard people quarrelling. Sometimes it sounds funny and sometimes it sounds merely unpleasant; but however it sounds, I believe we can learn something very important from listening to the kind of things they say. They say things like this: ‘How’d you like it if anyone did the same to you?’ -- ‘That’s my seat, I was there first’ -- ‘Leave him alone, he isn’t doing you any harm’ -- ‘Why should you shove in first?’ -- ‘Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine’ -- ‘Come on, you promised.’ People say things like that everyday, educated people as well as uneducated, and children as well as grown-ups. Now what interests me about all these remarks is that the man who makes them is not merely saying that the other man’s behaviour does not happen to please him. He is appealing to some kind of standard of behaviour which he expects the other man to know about. And the other man very seldom replies: ‘To hell with your standard.’ Nearly always he tries to make out that what he has been doing does not really go against the standard, or that it it does there is some special excuse….This law was called the Law of Nature because people thought that everyone knew it by nature and did not need to be taught it. They did not mean, of course, that you might not find an odd individual here and there who did not know it, just as you find a few people who are colour-blind or have no ear for a tune. But taking the race as a whole, they thought that the human idea of decent behaviour was obvious to every one. And I believe they were right. If they were not, then all the things we said about the war were nonsense. What was the sense in saying the enemy were in the wrong unless Right is a real thing which the Nazis at bottom knew as well as we did and ought to have practiced? If they had had no notion of what we mean by right, then, though we might still have had to fight them, we could no more have blamed them for that than for the colour of their hair.
Lewis’ point is unmistakeable, if morality is not objective, that is true equally for all people no matter their country or culture or time, then we can not rightfully aside blame nor praise to any action in any meaningful way.
But what is this standard and how did it come to rest upon all of mankind in such a way that it is undeniable? The founding fathers of our nation agreed that there are certain moral truths which are not reasonably denied and they named the source of those moral truths when they wrote, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Thomas Jefferson, and the founding fathers of the United States of America along with him, grounded moral truth in the Creator, God, and rightfully so.
There is no other place where one could possibly hope to ground objective morality than in the Creator of the universe. If morality were grounded in individuals or even nations as whole this would still lead to irresolvable conflicts because it is merely people disagreeing with one another none of whom have ultimate authority over the other. If there is a binding moral code that is upon all mankind it must come from a higher authority not from within man. Essentially the Moral Argument, if it succeeds, leaves the skeptic with two choices.
One choice is simply to deny that there is such a thing as right and wrong. This would mean that torturing babies, raping women and beheading people because they are a different color than you is not wrong. You may not like how it makes you feel, but you cannot object to it on the basis of any kind of objective standard of moral truth. Might and majority define what is right for the moment in these situations. Furthermore the person who pushes a child out of the way of a car and sacrifices his life in the process is not a hero, he has done nothing truly good. You just have warm feelings for what he has done. There is nothing blameworthy or praiseworthy in any meaningful sense by which you ought to expect others to see it the same as you. The other choice, however, is to admit that there is objective moral truth and all that this entails, namely, that God exists as the only sufficient ground for morality.
Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this brief paper to demonstrate the usefulness of natural theology for Christian theologians. It has been demonstrated that there is an important distinction between supernatural revelation and natural revelation and that the universal availability of natural revelation makes it an appropriate starting place to discuss the possibility of God’s existence and, in turn, the reasonability of God’s self disclosure to mankind (special revelation). After the establishment of this distinction it has been demonstrated that from philosophical reasoning, and interaction with the physical world, arguments can be formulated that point strongly to the reasonableness of God’s existence. In the Ontological Argument it is shown that the very concept of God may be self authenticating. In the Teleological Argument it shown that the universe has elements of design which are best explained by an intelligent designer. In the Cosmological Argument, by observing cause and effect relationship and the impossibility of infinite regression, it was shown that there must be an efficient cause for all things that is, itself, uncaused, eternal and unchangeable. Finally in the Moral Argument it was demonstrated that only a Moral Law giver, the Creator, can establish grounds for objective morality and so if objective moral values exists then God exists.
It is, of course, obvious that so much more could be said about any one of the argument presented in this brief paper. That being said the purpose of this paper was to establish the usefulness of natural theology, particularly in demonstrating that belief in God and doing supernatural theology is completely rational. This has been accomplished if what is meant by rational is not that all rational people must be persuaded, necessarily, to agree that God exists and that he has revealed himself in supernatural ways but, rather, that rational people may have substantial ground to stand on when they are persuaded. Rational people disagree about all kind of issues and they are not necessarily irrational for their position, even if it turns out that they were wrong, if they had sufficient warrant for believing what they did.
Natural theology provides a firm foundation for those who believe in God and who believe that God has spoken. It not only gives confidence to those who believe already but it also gives skeptics a reason to consider God’s existence as a real possibility. Because natural theology derives all of its arguments from information that is generally accessible to all mankind, unlike supernatural revelation, it is the best place to start when making a case for belief in God. Through the use of natural theology the truth of theism can be reasonably defended and offered to others as a platform to believe more as revealed by supernatural theology.
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As to the first point, it has become in vogue to knock the idea of love at first sight. We do not believe in such nonsense now. In fact many have come to even ridicule the idea of ‘true love’ itself. We live in a culture that mocks the idea of committed monogamous love. Divorce is always an option when a young couple goes into marriage and even the idea of marriage itself seems rather old fashioned and outmoded to many. 
